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Abstract:  Establishing an effective management of former open access fisheries can 
increase resource rents from close to zero to numbers as high as several 
hundred Mio $ p.a., as it has been the the case in Iceland's cod fishery. 
Whenever the corresponding harvesting rights are given out free of charge 
as in the commonly applied grandfathering approach, these resource rents 
constitute a significant producer surplus. The effect of management on 
consumer surplus has been studied to a much lesser extend. In this paper 
we derive conditions on the natural dynamics of the fish stock, harvesting 
costs and consumer preferences under which consumer surplus under 
effective management is lower than in an unregulated fishery. This 
potentially gives rise to an additional distributional problem in managed 
fisheries with grandfathered ITQs, as they may generate revenues for ITQ 
holders not only by increasing the efficiency of the fishery, but in part also 
by shifting welfare from consumers to ITQ holders. We conduct a 
bioeconomic modeling analysis of how the fisheries transformations from 
open access (OA) to maximum economic yield (MEY) management affect 
consumer surplus. First, we compare the open access with the MEY 
equilibrium and derive conditions under which consumer surplus under 
MEY management is higher or lower than under OA. Second, we study the 
effects on consumer surplus during the transition phase from an OA fishery 
to a fishery that is managed under MEY in the long run.  
 